TMR Capital wishes you a healthy, happy, and prosperous New Year. As we look back on 2020, there are many observations we can make. However, we anticipate you have heard plenty about the impact of the global pandemic on the world around us and on the financial markets. Accordingly, we will focus on TMR's strategies and how they faired over the last quarter of 2020 and throughout the year. As you know, TMR takes a private equity approach to public equity investing. We seek non-traditional value in public equities while maintaining flexibility and liquidity on behalf of our investors. 2020 brought a series of opportunities for both the TMR Long Short Opportunities, LP, and the TMR Long Bias Opportunities, LP. As always, we welcome your questions and feedback, and we look forward to working with you as we continue to identify opportunities for investment within our portfolios.

STRATEGY	Q4 2020	2020	NET ANN. Return
TMR Long Bias Opportunities, LP	23.5%	44.5%	34.2%
TMR Long Short Opportunities, LP	2.7%	12.4%	42.0%
S&P 500 Index	11.7%	16.3%	20.4%
Eurekahedge Long Short HF Index	10.7%	16.4%	17.2%

TMR Long Short Opportunities, LP Highlights

The portfolio benefitted from long investments in secular growth stories purchased at reasonable valuations. Our long portfolio continues to be focused on companies experiencing powerful secular growth trends. Some have benefited from COVID-19 while others have been temporarily negatively affected but we believe they will emerge stronger.

The short portfolio is focused on secularly declining businesses and was negatively affected when these structurally declining businesses rallied after the COVID-19 vaccine announcement. We anticipate the rally to be temporary because our shorts were in secular decline before COVID-19 and the virus simply accelerated their decline. Time is the enemy of the poor business and the friend of the high-quality compounder. Because the earnings are in structural decline, the valuation multiple is expanding even if the share price stays constant. However, the share prices have rallied post the COVID-19 vaccine announcement making their valuation multiples even more unsustainable.

TMR Long Bias Opportunities, LP Highlights

Our long-biased investment offering, the TMR Long Bias Opportunities, LP portfolio benefitted from long investments in secular growth stories purchased at reasonable valuations. We continue to focus on companies experiencing powerful secular growth trends, many of whom benefitted from product and service offerings needed to address the global pandemic, while others have been negatively affected. However, we consider the negative effects where present to be temporary, and that these companies will emerge stronger.

TMR Long Position Updates

The following long positions are held within TMR's Long Short Opportunities, LP and TMR's Long Biased Opportunities, LP.

IAC

IAC is an internet conglomerate and has been one of the great shareholder value creation stories of the past 25 years. Barry Diller began his run with the Silver King TV station group in 1995 and through a series of successful acquisitions and spin-offs, has evolved Silver King into what ultimately became known as IAC, growing the company from $250 million of market cap to roughly $15 billion (not including the value of spinoffs) today. During the ensuing 25 years, IAC has compounded at 14% per annum, far greater than the S&P 500. IAC's outperformance has been even more pronounced over the past three, five and ten years with CAGRS of 50%, 34% and 29%, respectively. The below schematic shows the growth of IAC, which began as Silver King in 1995:



Source: IAC Investor Presentation

IAC is both a high-quality compounder and a special situation machine. The firm has an exceptional track record of growing businesses and separating assets to maximize shareholder value. IAC's major assets are:

ANGI: The largest asset inside IAC is ANGI. ANGI is a marketplace that matches buyers with providers of home services, covering 500 tasks. The market is robust with 12% of homeowners using the service, making 27 million requests in 2019 from 250,000 service providers. The company operates under 3 brands in the US and 5 brands in Europe. Management believes the business can compound revenue at 20-25% per year for the foreseeable future. EBITDA margins are expected to ultimately approach 40% as the business matures and cements its dominance. The below chart demonstrates the value of market leadership:

The total addressable market in North America is $400 billion, the European market estimated at $300 billion. In 2020, the company is broadening the rollout of pre-priced transactions for over 150 tasks. This should reduce the amount of friction in transacting with service providers, leading to higher conversion rates. The market underestimates the growth potential and powerful underlying unit economics of ANGI. Comparable online marketplaces trade at over 10x Revenue.



Vimeo: Vimeo is a SaaS video-tools provider. Vimeo tools can be used to create, edit, customize, distribute, monitor and measure video. With its tools, Vimeo users can create high-impact videos in minutes. Vimeo has 1.236 million paid subscribers and enjoyed 2019 revenues of $196 million, up from $160 million. Management believes the business can sustain 20% revenue growth for the foreseeable future. The business is benefitted from accelerating growth in the enterprise market.

Vimeo has 105 million register members and its subscribers have an average lifetime of 4.5 years. Roughly one half of its subscribers reside outside the US market. 60% of Fortune 500 companies have a Vimeo account. IAC recently announced it will spinoff Vimeo. Comparable enterprise software companies trade at 10x-30x Revenue compared to IAC's current 3.8x TEV/Revenue.

Dotdash: Dotdash is one of the largest online publishers. According to Comscore, 1 in 3 US Internet users use at least one of Dotdash's sites each month, with the company enjoying 96 million unique monthly users. The business has enjoyed compound annual revenue growth of 29% over the past 3 years and management believes the business can sustain 20%+ top-line growth. The company focuses on high impact content verticals and optimizes those websites for Google SEO. The company's sites have the freshest content, the fastest loading sites and the fewest adds. The targeted verticals include: health, tech, travel, food, finance, beauty and home. The company is competing well in most of these verticals today.

Applications: The applications segment consists of two businesses: the Mosaic Group (mobile revenue) and the Ask applications (desktop). During 2019, mobile revenue was $199 million while desktop was $320 million. Overall revenue declined from $582 to $520 million. Management is hopeful this segment will infect at some point in the next year or so, as mobile revenue contributions begin to more than offset declines from desktop.

Emerging Opportunities and Other: IAC recently announced the acquisition of Care.com, a two-side marketplace matching caregivers to those seeking such services. The company paid $500 million for a business with $200 million of revenue and $20 million of EBITDA. This acquisition has attractive long-term potential and management likens the opportunity to that of ANGI.

One area of concern has been IAC's reliance on Google. For the years ended December 31, 2019, 2018 and 2017, total revenue earned from Google was $733.5 million, $825.2 million and $740.7 million, respectively, representing 27%, 33% and 38%, respectively, of New IAC's combined revenue. As IAC continues to diversify and grow its portfolio IAC's reliance on Google should continue to lessen.

IAC has a diverse portfolio of internet businesses many of which are benefitting from secular growth trends and operate in large TAM's. With such a modest valuation, if only one IAC bet turns into a major success, shareholders stand to be disproportionately rewarded. Over the past five years, that bet turned out to be MTCH.

With $5.4 billion of cash and virtually no debt, IAC is well positioned to make organic investments back into its secularly attractive portfolio companies as well as make bold acquisitions and minority investments. IAC will likely continue to compound intrinsic value and its stock price at high rates of return.

CACC

CACC is a best-in-class U.S. subprime auto lender. CACC is a high-quality, high-ROE (low leverage) compounder with a difficult-to-replicate business run by an A+ management team. Unlike CACC's peers which are lower quality, more levered and highly cyclical, CACC's unique lending practices make CACC's business model lower-risk, defensive and countercyclical. Despite a defensive and low-risk business model that peers have been unable to replicate, significant growth prospects, loan yields near historical trough levels, and a history of excellent capital allocation and operating results CACC's stock price has materially underperformed this year and trades at record low valuations.

The subprime auto lending industry is highly competitive, with volatile and cyclical economic and competitive swings as demonstrated below:



Source: CACC Investor Letter

CACC's unique portfolio program has enabled it to have a superior defensive counter-cyclical business. In the traditional auto lending framework, a consumer purchases a car with a down payment and then receives financing offers from lenders that cover the balance of the retail price of the vehicle. These offers are mainly based on the consumer's creditworthiness, and the value of the collateral. CACC targets consumers that struggle to qualify for financing in this traditional framework, but it does not do so simply by extending riskier loans. Rather than advancing an amount that covers the entire retail price of the vehicle, CACC only advances dealers an amount that allows them to cover their cost and earn a small upfront profit. The dealer has the opportunity to earn additional back-ended profit through a sharing agreement with CACC, but only after CACC has received ~130% of its initial advance. A close relationship with auto dealers and deep understanding of the consumer segment is required to facilitate this lending model, which creates a meaningful barrier for entrants seeking to duplicate CACC's approach.

Counterintuitively, this model allows CACC to make loans that have both higher returns and lower risk than its auto lending peers, despite the fact that it targets a weaker segment of the credit spectrum. This is because CACC advances a much lower amount to dealers (improving downside protection and reducing capital intensity) and recovers its principal on a first-out basis. After ~130% of its principal is recovered, CACC takes 20% of the cash flow as servicing fee in addition to being reimbursed for certain collection costs (equates to ~25%). Since 1992, the average spread between advance and collected payments is ~25% of loan value; this figure has never gotten close to zero, meaning CACC has never failed to recover its loan to the dealer. The dealer, meanwhile, benefits from increased sales volumes driven by access to a segment of the consumer population it otherwise would not be able to address. The benefits of this model can be seen in over a decade of data during which CACC has earned an average ROA of 10% and ROE of 30%, both roughly double the average of its peers. Importantly, CACC did not report a single year of losses in that period. These results have come alongside significant growth, with adjusted earnings rising at 15%+ CAGR over the last decade.

A more detailed look at the portfolio program: CACC advances just ~45% of a consumer's loan value (principal and interest) or ~67% of the loan principal. The consumer's down payment and the CACC advance generally covers the dealer's cost of goods and allows them to earn a small up-front profit. As the consumer makes payments on its loan, CACC keeps all cash flows until ~130% of the loan to dealer is collected, and then it takes a stream of ~25% from the remaining cash flow as servicing fee.

Program example at the time of the vehicle sale:

Program example during loan repayments / collections:



There are two important takeaways from this structure: (i) the small size of the initial advance provides an immense margin of safety, as CACC needs to collect less than half of all loan obligations in order to recover its advance and (ii) the payback period on the initial advance is very short (two to three years on average) since CACC receives all cash flows until its advance is fully repaid. The combination of these factors means CACC earns an annualized return of 20%-25% with significant downside protection due to their priority position in the waterfall.

CACC gives up modest upside for significant downside protection. This model improves business performance because it increases the stability of returns and provides far greater downside protection. Downside protection has outsized benefit to upside optionality in this industry because losses could lead to liquidity constraints that further destabilize the business.

CACC will likely be a hidden Covid winner because CACC benefits from dislocations in the industry. CACC has a long history of underwriting discipline and collections execution, enabling CACC to gain market share from competitors during recession/periods where capital leaves the industry, earning ROICs in excess of its cost of capital with ROIC increasing during recessions. The company has shown an ability to achieve an attractive ROIC, above its cost of capital. ROIC peaked in 2010, likely due to the reduction in competition as competitors went out of business during the financial crisis. The disruption brought by Covid will likely be no different. I anticipate CACC will underwrite its most profitable loans in years and continue compounding intrinsic value at a rapid pace.

TMR Short Position Updates

The following short positions are held within TMR's Long Short Opportunities, LP.

Short A

Short A is a structurally declining IT consulting and services company that is being disrupted by the cloud. Increasingly, businesses and governments can decrease their capital intensity by tapping into computing power by going online and connecting to a cloud service host rendering Short A's services burdensome and unnecessary. Computing projects that used to take weeks are now completed in a couple hours on the public cloud at a fraction of the cost. The public cloud has become a low margin quasi-utility. As Adrian Cockcroft, CTO of Netflix said, "there is zero revenue for traditional IT" in the public cloud. The public cloud does not support Short A's high-margin operating model because cloud users pay low variable expenses instead of the high capital expenditures that Short A is dependent on. Although Short A trades at a "cheap" single digit earnings multiple the earnings are in structural decline making Short A a classic value trap.

Short B

Short B is a structurally declining broadcasting company that is being disrupted by the shift towards streaming. People love movies and TV shows, but they do not love the linear TV experience, where channels present programs only at particular times on non-portable screens with complicated remote controls. Now streaming entertainment - which is on-demand, personalized, and available on any screen - is replacing linear TV. Changes of this magnitude are rare. Radio was the dominant home entertainment media for nearly 50 years until linear TV took over in the 1950's and 1960's. Linear video in the home was a huge advance over radio, and exceptionally large firms emerged to meet consumer desires over the last 60 years. The new era of streaming entertainment, which began in the mid-2000's, is also likely to be big and enduring, given the flexibility and ubiquity of the internet around the world. Streaming entertainment is expanding rapidly for a variety of reasons including:

- Ecosystem Growth: The internet is getting faster and more reliable, while penetration of connected devices, like smart TVs and smart phones is also rising

- Freedom and Flexibility: Consumers can watch content on demand, on any screen, and the experience is personalized to individual tastes

- Rapid Innovation: streaming entertainment apps have frequent improvement updates and streaming is the primary source of UHD 4K video content.

Eventually, as linear TV viewing falls in viewership and value, the spectrum it now uses on cable, fiber, and over-the-air will be reallocated to expand internet data transmission. Satellite TV subscribers will be fewer and more rural. In a few decades, linear TV will be the fixed-line telephone: no longer mainstream. By 2024 roughly half of all U.S. TV households will have cut the cord or never had traditional pay TV. While streaming became mainstream in the last decade, it is still a minority of TV viewing. We have now entered the streaming decade when consumers around the world will choose streaming as their primary way of viewing TV as shown below:



Linear TV Advertising Is Approaching a Cliff

Ad-supported over-the-top (OTT) streaming channels should gain significant market share during the next few years. According to ARK's research, OTT ad revenues could increase more than 7x during the next five years, from nearly $6 billion in 2019 to roughly $44 billion in 2024.



Forecasts are inherently limited and cannot be relied upon.
Source: ARK Investment Management LLC, 2019; "Booming Internet Ads Power Faster Global Adspend Growth." Zenith, 21 Mar. 2019, https://arkinv.st/36juELP.

Short B will be disrupted from the re-platforming of the TV ecosystem from traditional linear TV distribution and legacy pay TV services. As TV streaming has become mainstream, consumers are spending more time watching TV streaming services, with many leaving legacy pay TV services entirely. As the shift to TV streaming continues, advertisers looking to reach and engage streaming audiences will take advantage of the benefits inherent with digital advertising capabilities available in TV streaming and will re-allocate their budgets accordingly. In the long run, it is possible that all TV content will be streamed, shifting billions of advertising dollars from linear TV to OTT to the detriment of Short B. Like Short A, Short B trades at a "cheap" single digit earnings multiple. However, Short B's earnings are in structural decline making Short B overvalued and a value trap.

We look forward to providing further updates on these and other portfolio holdings as we move into 2021. Until then, we wish you a safe, healthy, and happy New Year.

This material does not constitute an offer or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any interests in TMR Partners LP ("**TMR Partners**") and/or TMR Partners Long Short Opportunities, LP ("**TMR Long Short**"), both Delaware limited partnerships (each a "**Fund**" and collectively, the "**Funds**"), which such offer will only be made via a confidential private placement memorandum (the "**Memorandum**") pertaining to such Fund. An investment in the Funds is speculative and is subject to a risk of loss, including a risk of loss of principal. There is no secondary market for interests in the Funds and none is expected to develop. No assurance can be given that the Funds will achieve their objective or that an investor will receive a return of all or part of its investment. All statements herein are qualified in their entirety by reference to the relevant Fund Memorandum, and to the extent that this document contradicts that Memorandum, the Memorandum shall govern in all respects.

This material is confidential and may not be distributed or reproduced in whole or in part without the express written consent of TMR Capital LLC, a Michigan limited liability company (the "**Investment Manager**"). the information in this document is not personalized investment advice or an investment recommendation on the part of the Investment Manager. No representation, warranty, or undertaking, express or implied, is given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information or opinions contained in this document, and no liability is accepted as to the accuracy or completeness of any such information or opinions. This material is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on for, tax, legal, or accounting advice. You should consult your own tax, legal, and accounting advisers before engaging in any investment transaction.

In the case of both TMR Partners and TMR Long Short, the performance data discussed herein reflect the deduction of: (i) an annual asset management fee of 2.0%, charged quarterly; (ii) a performance allocation of 20%, taken annually, subject to a "high water mark;" and (iii) transaction fees and other expenses actually incurred. Results were achieved using the investment strategies described in the Memorandum.

Results are compared to the performance of the S&P 500 Index and the Eurekahedge Long Short Equities Hedge Fund Index (collectively, the "**Comparative Indexes**") for informational purposes only. The Fund's investment program does not mirror any of the Comparative Indexes and the volatility of the Fund's investment program may be materially different from the volatility of the Comparative Indexes. The securities included in the Comparative Indexes are not necessarily included in the Fund's investment program and criteria for inclusion in the Comparative Indexes are different than criteria for investment by the Fund. The performance of the Comparative Indexes reflects the reinvestment of dividends, as appropriate.

This material contains certain forward-looking statements and projections regarding market trends, investment strategy, and the future asset allocation of the Funds, including indicative guidelines regarding position limits, exposures, position sizing, diversification, and other indications regarding the Funds' strategies. These projections and guidelines are included for illustrative purposes only, are inherently predictive, speculative, and involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. The guidelines included herein do not reflect strict rules or limitations on any Fund's investment program and that Fund may deviate from the guidelines described herein. There are a number of factors that could cause actual events and developments to differ materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements, projections, and guidelines, and no assurances can be given that the forward-looking statements in this document will be realized or followed, as described. These forward-looking statements will not necessarily be updated in the future.

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS.